Hitler England & USA. His puppet master, then Who killed the jew?

Discussion in 'History' started by lorenhough, Dec 15, 2017.

  1. Suchender

    Suchender New Member

    Thank you for the suggestion, Richard !
    I'm on the first chapter (done with the introduction) and it sounds interesting.

    Is there a discussion on Postflaviana of his book so I could read your comments ?
     
  2. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

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  3. Jerry Russell

    Jerry Russell Administrator Staff Member

    This "Icebreaker" book by Viktor Suvorov (1985) presents remarkably thorough and meticulous documentation of its thesis that Stalin had been preparing an aggressive war against Hitler's regime in Germany and across Europe.

    During the early and mid 1930's, Stalin had been simultaneously preparing for both offensive and defensive strategies. On the offensive side, the Soviets built a huge armada of Mark BT tanks, which were high-speed tanks that could roll on wheels for operations on paved roads. The Soviet air force was also designed for offensive bombing operations and troop transport, and thousands of paratroopers were trained.

    However, for defensive operations, Stalin built a huge system of fortified regions known as the "Stalin Line". Suvorov explains:

    Each fortified region was in fact a military formation equivalent to a brigade in numerical strength, but equal to a corps in fire-power. Every region was made up of a command and a headquarters, between two and eight machine-gun and artillery battalions, one artillery regiment, several batteries of heavy caponier artillery, a tank battalion, a communications company or battalion, a sapper engineering battalion and other sub- units. Each region covered an area of 100-180 kilometres along the front, to a depth of 30-50 kilometres. A complex system of combat and supply installations, armoured and built of reinforced concrete, was constructed in the zone; there were also underground premises, built of reinforced concrete, to serve as storage depots, electrical power stations, hospitals, command points and communications centres. The underground installations were linked by a complicated system of tunnels, galleries and overlapping communication trenches.

    After the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact was signed in August 1939, Stalin completely stopped all defensive planning, and focused entirely on offensive preparation. The non-aggression pact allowed Germany and Russia to split Poland between them, thus removing the buffer zone and establishing a Russian-German border. The Russians soon invaded Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and parts of Finland and Romania, thus broadening the common front between Soviet and German spheres of influence.

    With the border decisively moved towards Germany, the Stalin Line was completely defunded, abandoned, and in some parts destroyed. Suvorov argues that this was done because the fortifications of the Stalin Line would have hindered free movement of troops and supplies for offensive actions at the front, so it was worse than useless in an aggressive war.

    During 1940 and 1941, Suvorov argues, Stalin put on a show of building a new defensive line closer to the border, while vast squadrons of troops and equipment were quietly being brought into position for a surprise attack on the Germans. The preparations were so vast and expensive that Suvorov says the situation was basically irreversible, and that the troops were in danger of starvation if they could not obtain food and supplies by invading enemy territory. Suvorov goes so far as to speculate:

    There are quite a few indications that the date for the beginning of the Soviet Operation Groza ('Thunderstorm') was fixed for 6 July 1941. Memoirs of Soviet marshals, generals and admirals, archival documents, the mathematical analysis of information or the movements of thousands of Soviet military railway trains all point to 10 July as the date on which the full concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army would be achieved on the Soviet western borders. Soviet military theory, however, lays down that the move over to a decisive offensive should not follow but precede the full concentration of troops. In that event, a number of those military trains belonging to the Second Strategic Echelon could have been off-loaded directly on enemy territory, for its troops to go directly into battle.

    Zhukov and Stalin liked to deliver their surprise strikes on Sunday mornings, and 6 July 1941 was the last Sunday before the concentration of Soviet troops was complete. General Ivanov's statement directly points to this date: 'The German troops succeeded in forestalling us literally by two weeks.'

    During May and June 1941, the Soviets issued statements publicly reaffirming their devotion to the non-aggression pact and their friendship with the Germans. Suvorov says that this Soviet propaganda was aimed at lulling the Germans into complacency. Meanwhile, enormous aggressive preparations were proceeding apace behind the scenes. In spite of all the Soviet efforts to camouflage their intentions, Suvorov speculates that Hitler belatedly became informed of the Soviet plan. If Stalin had succeeded, the attack would have dealt an absolutely devastating blow to the German military machine. Stalin might have swept quickly across the entire European continent, "liberating" all Hitler's recent conquests. Hitler desperately decided to preempt the Russian plan with an attack of his own, which began on June 22. Hitler's initial blitzkrieg against the Russians was highly effective, and the Russian air force was largely destroyed on the ground. It took years for the Soviets to recover from the blow. Suvorov says that Stalin was truly caught by surprise by Hitler's attack, not only because he thought that the Germans had been taken in by the non-aggression pact and Russia's declarations of neutrality, but also because Stalin's spies had been watching for evidence of serious aggressive plans on Hitler's part. The Russians reasoned that if the Germans were going to attack Russia, then surely they would take basic precautions such as acquiring winter coats, and suitable lubricants for winter vehicle operations. The Germans never made those basic logistical plans, and attacked on the spur of the moment. The lack of planning led to their ultimate demise, but ironically facilitated the successful surprise attack.

    According to a 2015 paper by Christopher Kshyk, Suvorov's thesis has been widely rejected by "orthodox" historians. Kshyk notes that Suvorov has no solid documentary evidence of Stalin's alleged plans for an attack in July 1941. "Orthodox" scholars also argue that preparations, as advanced as they might have been, were nonetheless incomplete. Kshyk notes that the debate has become heavily politicized, with "orthodox" scholars determined to maintain Germany's culpability for its aggression, and Russia's innocent neutrality.

    Kshyk also mentions that "The notion of a Soviet pre-emptive strike is also attacked [by orthodox historians] on the basis that such a concept was originally used by Hitler to justify his attack on the Soviet Union." But regardless of Stalin's actual intentions, Soviet actions gave Hitler plenty of basis for a realistic conclusion that such an attack was highly likely.
     
    Last edited: Nov 27, 2018
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  4. Jerry Russell

    Jerry Russell Administrator Staff Member

  5. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    Luvrov?

    I think Suvorov makes some very good points in support of his thesis, such as Stalin's taking of the Baltic countries, parts of Finland and Romania, while there were only complaints about Hitler's similar actions. And then the fact that the Mark BT tanks could never have been thought usable in Russia or any neighboring country, because they don't have suitable roads. But Germany and such did. Hence the partition of Poland was a huge advantage in the Soviet strategy, ala Suvorov. Same goes for the design of the Soviet air force, which was always cast as inferior. If it was designed for air to ground offense, and especially a devastating surprise attack, then it would be easy to re-characterize it as inferior for defensive purposes - because it would be true.

    The BT tanks were "convertible tanks". This was a feature designed by J. Walter Christie to reduce wear of the unreliable tank tracks of the 1930s. In about thirty minutes, the crew could remove the tracks and engage a chain drive to the rearmost road wheel on each side, allowing the tank to travel at very high speeds on roads. In wheeled mode, the tank was steered by pivoting the front road wheels. Soviet tank forces soon found the convertible option of little practical use; in a country with few paved roads, it consumed space and added needless complexity and weight. The feature was dropped from later Soviet designs.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BT_tank

    [​IMG] A BT-7​

    The BT design was dropped because the Nazis beat Stalin to the punch, putting Stalin on the defensive in his own land. The Soviets had already built thousands of BT tanks by this time, and thus had to have known their limitation - and their value in operating on such as German roads.

    Suvorov also presents various Sovirt press and Politburo statements, including a leak to French press, that one would have to assume that German intel could have gleaned the Soviet intent from such.
     
    Last edited: Nov 27, 2018
  6. Jerry Russell

    Jerry Russell Administrator Staff Member

    Misspellings fixed, thx.
     
  7. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    One question that grows increasingly apparent when reading Icebreaker is just why the Soviets expended so much effort in actively destroying their extensive network of frontier defenses. Why not just abandon facilities, place equipment and ammunition in storage, and then redeploy defensive troops into offensive ones? So far Suvorov has not provided a sufficient answer to the totality of what he describes. For instance, the explosive demolition of the Stalin Line, which I had never heard of before this. According to Suvorov's description the Stalin Line was far superior to the French Maginot Line.

    Perhaps Suvorov will come to a better motive as I read further, but this sounds like Stalin, at a minimum, was a traitor working for someone else, much like the current President of the USA (and including his Russian friend). Suvorov does catch out Marshal Voronov in his misdirection. In any case, Stalin could indeed have used resources to build the Molotov Line and then just mothballed the Stalin Line. The work on the latter was probably just to mollify those Soviet generals that were concerned about what was going on.

    In fairness, however, it must be said that in the summer of 1940, construction began of a belt of fortified regions directly on the new Soviet-German frontier. It was never completed. The Soviet General Staff, not without a certain degree of irony, gave these new fortified regions the unofficial title of the Molotov Line. The decision to embark upon its construction was taken on 26 June 1940. (V. Anfilov, op. cit., p. 162) Construction proceeded very slowly on the new frontier, although the destruction of the old defences went ahead with surprising speed.

    The tragedy of the Stalin Line reached its apotheosis in the spring of 1941:

    I do not know how future historians will explain this crime against our people. Present-day historians pass over this event in complete silence, and I do not know why. The Soviet government fleeced its people of many billions of roubles (no less than 120 billion, according to my calculations) in order to build fortifications, impregnable to any enemy, along the entire western frontier, from sea to sea, from the grey Baltic to the azure Black Sea. Yet just before war broke out, in spring 1941, powerful explosions thundered along the 1,200-kilometre-long stretch of fortifications. Strong double and single caponiers built of reinforced concrete, firing positions with one, two and three embrasures, command posts, observation posts, and tens of thousands of permanent defensive installations were all blown up on Stalin's personal orders. (Major-General P. G. Grigorenko, VPodpol'eMozhno Vstretit' Tol'ko Krys, New York 1981, p. 141)

    Thus, the Stalin Line on the old frontier had already been obliterated, while the Molotov Line on the new frontier had still to be built. After the war, and after Stalin died, Soviet generals and marshals chorused their indignation. Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov had this to say: 'How could our leadership, having failed to build the necessary defensive zones on the new western frontier in 1939, take the decision to abolish and disarm the fortified regions on the former borders?' (Na sluzhbe Voennoi, Moscow Voenizdat 1963, p. 172)

    The Marshal's indignation is false, however. He scolds 'our leadership', but he himself was Colonel-General of Artillery, one of the most senior posts in the Red Army command, at the time. Can it really be that the anti-tank and caponier guns were withdrawn from production without his knowledge? Did he really not know that the Artillery caponiers in the Stalin Line were being stripped of armament and obliterated? Voronov deliberately asks the wrong question in order to distract the reader's attention from the essence of the problem. He seems to think that the Molotov Line should have been built first, and then the Stalin Line broken up afterwards. In putting the question this way, Voronov tacitly justifies the destruction of the Stalin Line; his criticism is not that it was done at all, but only that it was done prematurely.

    But why not ask another question - why break up the Stalin Line at all? The events of 1940 had confirmed twice over that two defensive strips are better than one. In 1940 the Red Army paid a high price in blood to break through the Mannerheim Line, compelling Finland to concede to Stalin's demands. Later that year, the German Army passed round the side of the French Maginot Line, broke out on to a broad expanse of territory where it could operate without restriction, and that was the end of the war for France. It is unfortunate that neither France nor Finland had a second line, deep in their heartlands; in that case it is unlikely that either invasion would have succeeded.

    Stalin had just such a second line – and then assiduously broke it up. Over the years, Soviet apologists have devised a great number of explanations for this apparent act of folly. One of these is that there was insufficient armament to equip the new fortified regions, so that equipment had to be taken from the Stalin Line. This argument fails on several counts, however. Firstly, if the Molotov Line was short of armament, why were the ordnance plants not ordered to step up production? Not only was no such order given, but the production of standard armaments was actually stopped.
    (Icebreaker, pp. 89-90)

     
  8. Jerry Russell

    Jerry Russell Administrator Staff Member

    As I mentioned earlier, Suvorov came up with this explanation for the destruction of the Stalin Line defense:

    After the frontier had been moved a couple of hundred kilometres to the west, the Stalin Line completely lost its importance as a fortified springboard for further aggression; and once the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact had been signed, Stalin no longer had any intention of thinking in terms of defence. This is why the Line was dismantled and then broken up. It was in the way of that great mass of troops who had their sights secretly fixed upon the German frontier. It would also hinder the process of supplying the Red Army with the millions of tons of ammunition, food supplies and fuel it would need on its victorious 'liberation' campaign. The corridors between the fortified zones were perfectly adequate for both military and economic needs in peacetime, but in the course of a war, rivers of consignments of supplies would have to be split up into thousands of little streams, so that they would be invulnerable to enemy counter-action. The fortified regions squeezed transport columns into comparatively narrow corridors. That sealed the fate of the already redundant Line.

    Considering everything else Suvorov said, this doesn't make a lot of sense. Perhaps Suvorov's book was controversial enough for its time, without also making insinuations about Stalin's loyalty.
     
  9. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    Suvorov did indeed make an explanation of this, however in doing so he contrasted what the Germans did in the same regard to their concrete facilities on the Siegfried Line. The Germans just locked the steel doors (albeit they lost the keys when they needed to retreat from Russia), versus the Soviets demolished their facilities. There would be no need to remove such as bridge demo charges either, as these aspects would have no impact on outgoing invasion forces.

    Suvorov even explains that the Germans were employing the exact same tactic of appearing to make defensive emplacements to mask their intent to invade. Does this mean that the Soviets were not able to recognize what the Germans were doing while the Soviets were doing this as well?
     
  10. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    The following long excerpt is the opening text from Chapter 22 of Icebreaker, titled The TASS Report. In earlier chapters Suvorov discusses that Stalin had made others, such as Molotov, responsible for actions taken in getting ready for WWII, and waiting until late to assuming the actual de jure office of governing, as opposed to merely being the head of the Communist Party, the de facto leader of the USSR. If anything had gone wrong he could blame them. Suvorov also briefly discussed prior that Stalin was very deft in eliminating his competition in rising to command of the party and thus the country. This is very similar to what Hitler did with taking over the NSDAP, except that Hitler was obviously very vocal in doing so.

    On 13 June 1941, Moscow Radio broadcast an unusual and puzzling report from TASS. It claimed that 'like the Soviet Union, Germany is also steadfastly observing the conditions of the Soviet—German non-aggression pact . . .' and that 'these rumours [of a German attack on the Soviet Union] are propaganda clumsily concocted by forces which are hostile to the Soviet Union and Germany, and which are interested in further extending and developing the war . . .' The main Soviet newspapers published this report the next day. Yet within the week, Germany had attacked the Soviet Union.

    Everybody knew who had written the TASS report. Stalin's characteristic style was recognized by generals serving in the various Soviet headquarters, by GULAG prisoners, and by Western experts. Although Stalin purged TASS after the war, none of the leading figures in this institution were ever accused of having spread reports which could have been considered 'manifestly harmful'. Stalin could also have put the blame for broadcasting the TASS report onto any member of the Politburo, but he did not do this either; he took the entire responsibility for it himself.

    Much has been written about this TASS report in both the foreign and the Soviet press. Everyone who has dealt with the subject has laughed at Stalin's touching naivety. The TASS report, however, is not so much amusing as mysterious and incomprehensible. Only one thing is clear: the identity of its author. All the rest is an enigma.

    The TASS report appears to contradict everything we know about Stalin's character. Boris Bazhanov, who was Stalin's personal secretary and knew him better than anyone, describes him as 'secretive and cunning in the extreme . . . He possessed the gift of silence to a high degree, and in this he was unique in a country where everyone talks too much.'

    Many writers have testified to Stalin's taciturnity: 'He was an irreconcilable enemy of verbal inflation, or garrulousness,' wrote Abdurachman Avtokhranov. 'Don't say what you think, and don't think what you say, could be another motto for his life.' Robert Conquest, a prominent researcher into the Stalin period, has observed that 'we still have to peer through the darkness of Stalin's exceptional secretiveness', and that 'Stalin never said what was on his mind, even when speaking about his political aims'. (The Great Terror)

    The ability to keep silent, in Dale Carnegie's apt words, is the most rarely found talent of all in human beings. From this viewpoint Stalin was a genius. Nor was this only a very strong trait in his character; it also served as a very strong weapon in dispute. He lulled his enemies with his silence, so that the suddenness of his blows made them irresistible. Why then did Stalin suddenly publicize his thoughts about relations with Germany in a Radio Moscow broadcast? Where was his secretiveness and cunning then? If Stalin had any thoughts about how future events would develop, why did he not discuss them in the close circle of his comrades-in-arms? Who passes important messages to his army through the radio station of the capital and the main newspapers? The army, navy, secret police, concentration camps, industry, transport, agriculture, and the entire population of the Soviet Union formed part of the state system. They were all subordinated, not to newspaper reports, but to their superiors, who in turn received orders through special, often secret channels from their chiefs. Stalin's empire was centralized like no other and, particularly after the Great Purge, the mechanism of state government was built in such a way that any order was immediately transmitted from the highest level down to the lowest functionaries, who rigorously carried it out. The large-scale operations in 1939 involving the arrest and elimination of Yezhov's supporters, and the actual replacement of the entire directorate of the secret police, were carried out quickly and effectively, in such a way that no one outside ever decoded the signal to begin the operations, or knew how or when Stalin gave the signal to set them in motion.

    If Stalin, in June 1941, had had ideas to put before millions of functionaries without delay, why did he not avail himself of that smooth machine of government, which would transmit any order immediately and without distortion? If it were a statement of some gravity, it could be duplicated on secret channels. The TASS report, according to Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, 'was not followed by any new policy instructions about the armed forces, or by any review of previously taken decisions'. (A. M. Vasilevsky: Delo Vsei Zhizni, Moscow IPL 1973, p. 120). The Marshal goes on to say that it changed nothing in the work of the General Staffer of the People's Commissariat for Defence. Indeed, 'it was essential that nothing should change'.

    No confirmation of the TASS report was sent along secret military channels. On the contrary, there are documents which show that, at the same time as the TASS report was published, an order was given to the troops in the military districts, including the Baltic Special Military District, which in both sense and spirit was directly contrary to the TASS report. (Archiv MO SSSR, Archive 344, schedule 2459, item n, p. 31) The material published in military newspapers, especially those which are unavailable to outsiders, was also in direct conflict to the content of the TASS report. (See for example Vice-Admiral I. I. Azarov; Osazhdennaya Odessa, Moscow Voenizdat)

    The TASS report was not only out of keeping with Stalin's character; it did not tally with the central idea of all communist mythology. Throughout his entire life, any communist tyrant, and especially Stalin, constantly repeats a simple and eminently comprehensible sentence: 'The enemy is watching.' This magic sentence explains the absence of meat in the shops, the 'liberation campaigns', censorship, torture, mass purges and closed frontiers. Phrases like 'the enemy is on the watch' and 'we are surrounded by enemies' are not just ideology; they are the sharpest weapon the Party has. This weapon destroyed all forms of opposition. Yet once, and only once in the history of all communist regimes, the head of the most powerful of them all told the whole world that the threat of aggression did not exist. ...

    Stalin's behaviors seem consistent with his following a hidden agenda, and thus the real need for his infamous purges. He needed to get rid of those he thought might be suspicious of odd actions, perhaps like why so completely destroying the facilities of the Stalin Line and the ability to blow up bridges in case the Germans attacked first. In this regard, I see Stalin bypassing even his normal mode of communicating, regarding the June 13 message as doing two things. First, it is a clear signal to the Germans that they had better attack soon, because waiting will allow the Soviets to have their armies ready, especially moved off of the transport trains and deployed. And second, it helped to lull the minds of enough Soviet officers and troops being deployed that there wasn't really an immanent German attack coming.

    Stalin had to know that the Germans were indeed massing for attack, via both aerial reconnaissance and from the vast network of communist partisans in Germany and elsewhere. The Soviets also saw that the Germans were establishing fake defensive positions at the frontier at the same time that they were doing the same. They also should have made sure that the first troops deployed to their western front were established as true covering forces for the subsequent arriving 'shock' troops. These first would act in temporary defensive mode in case the Germans attacked first, which they did, while being deployed near the Stalin Line, i.e. a considerable distance from the frontier.

    Of course, as Suvorov says, based upon the sheer numbers of logistics and vast land mass of the USSR, Hitler's goose was cooked either way. Suvorov also states that the Soviets tipped off Hitler, if by nothing else, the early deployment of an invasion force that threatened the oil fields in Romania. As such, why would the Germans have ever taken Stalin's 'enigmatic' message as that they could take their time in getting ready to launch Barbarossa? The message gave Stalin plausible deniability with what people are still crediting it as.

    And when the Germans attacked, those Russians already deployed were not in a defensive posture, with the wrong type of weapons, while many Soviet troops, arms, ammo, and fuel were sitting ducks on their trains. Stalin then 'purges' anyone that is a threat to the official story, to himself, and especially the hidden agenda.

     
    Last edited: Dec 9, 2018 at 8:51 PM
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  11. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    And so the question is begged: What hidden agenda?

    As I have discussed before on other threads, the contemporary institutional fascia [sic] of Postmodernist cant is that historical interpretations consisting of "grand meta-narrative" is impossible in reality. In truth, grand meta-narrative is only impossible within socially acceptable forms of consensus reality frameworks. Here, we can see the gross and dark effectiveness of contextual worldview framing between different cultures, and even subcultures. With the latter we can see the sharp differences within Islam, for instance, between the more rational literalism of Sunni Islam versus the more metaphorical, spiritual approaches of Shiite Islamic sects. Yet, there is only one objective reality, despite all the different lens.

    In effect, Postmodernism has forced most everyone to accept an a priori, Shit Happens, assumption of the nature of the development of Abrahamic 'civilizations', bloody as they are. Imagine if the objective reality is instead that the subtexts of the respective Abrahamic religious canons are telling us that they will spread themselves via the exact same bloody and devious methodologies described within the same canons, till a global order is achieved. Perhaps the end will even be achieved with an apocalyptic new revelation, where the omega 'End' of the existing age is the alpha of the new order.

    However, we are told DO NOT believe what 'Good Book' you read (too closely and make logical inferences from) ... or what you see happening in front of your own eyes. It's just random and spontaneous humanity in action, and .... in this 'randomness' is how the tag team of Satan and God/Allah mysteriously get things done (whether you believe in literalism or a metaphorical religious approach that is). So, get some popcorn, a comfortable (and hopefully safe) chair, and watch the shitshow unfold, all the world is a stage after all.

    The Postmodernist meme is but one alternative approach to describing historical and societal development. Once anyone takes a more expansive view of examining practically every significant historical event of consequence, that is, not taking the laundered accounts and interpretations of institutional sources that also demonstrate their own various a priori biases, then almost inevitably the appearance of threads emerge into view that form a hidden matrix. Or perhaps these threads are part of a metaphorical glove of a hidden hand, a hidden hand that guides more than Adam Smith's economic engine.

    And so if we disallow the summary dismissal of Postmodernism, and allow all the evidence into a rational (Modernist) approach of interpretation, we must confront hidden agendas, and the various sub rosa human linkages found throughout time and space. And ... that these connect in a contiguous fashion, about as well as the exoteric institutions of the Abrahamic religions. But no one has the temerity to suggest that these 'churches' and their 'sheep' are subject to Postmodernist limitations. Well, they are 'divine' for God's sake.

    And so, instead, we'll go forward in re-examining Hitler and Stalin, et al. with hopefully all blinkers and lens off. In subsequent posts we'll ask such as why Hitler reversed course from taking all western Europe and thus repeated Napoleon's 'error', made possible by Stalin telegraphing his massive 'invasion' plans sans a rudimentary defensive line (per Suvorov's Icebreaker). Why were we told that the Nazis were able to build such a war machine in the immediate aftermath of WWI and Weimar, and not told about the 'Allied' funneling of money and more into Nazi Germany, using such as the Bank of International Settlements (still extant today) -- created for this specific purpose?

    In doing so, perhaps we can further test the Postflavian model of Western historical interpretation, predicated on metaphorical shepherds, sheepdogs, and sheep.
     
  12. Suchender

    Suchender New Member

    For many weeks the Wehrmacht was concentrating it's forces on the (previously nonexistent) soviet border in Poland, and soviet pilots were constantly flying over those positions, so the soviet command (Stalin) knew that German agression is just a few days away.

    Still the Red Army was functioning under the order "do not react to provocations", "do not shoot at German aircraft". Even though in the night of June 22 Moscow had the formal war declaration on the table, that order was not reversed for 3 more days.
    Still orthodox historians complain about this "unfathomable", "unexplainable", even "treasonous" behavior by the highest Red Army command.

    In those 3 days the Red Army suffered the greatest defeat in the whole human military history. It needed 2 years (and A LOT of U.S. aid) to regain enough strength for victories against the weakened Wehrmacht/Germany in a strategically hopeless situation.

    One of those "Shit Happens" situations !

    Or is there a better explanation ?
    .
    soviet airfield June 1941.jpg
    Soviet airfield after the "surprise attack" by German air raids
    .
    Soviet artillery June 1941.jpg
    Soviet artillery waiting for the "liberators"
     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2018 at 9:27 AM
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  13. Jerry Russell

    Jerry Russell Administrator Staff Member

    It was Jean-Francois Lyotard ("The Postmodern Tradition", 1979) who said: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives." He defined metanarrative as "some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth." Examples of metanarratives from the "Modern" era would include such narratives as Capitalism, Progress, Emancipation, or Marxism, each of which has been viewed to represent the ideal or inevitable direction of history.

    With the position of incredulity towards those metanarratives, Wikipedia states that Postmodernists "attempt to replace metanarratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as on the diversity of human experience. They argue for the existence of a 'multiplicity of theoretical standpoints' rather than for grand, all-encompassing theories."

    So perhaps we Postflavians are right in tune with Postmodern thought? Are we not also skeptical of metanarratives such as Capitalism, Marxism, or Technological and Economic Progress? Are we not also focused on specific local contexts, such as the machinations of Ultramontane Catholics and Chabad Lubavichers?

    But fortunately, we need not be slavishly dedicated either to conforming with Postmodernism, or to overthrowing it. Postmodernism has already died, without any help from us. As early as 2006, Alan Kirby in The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond said:

    Most of the undergraduates who will take ‘Postmodern Fictions’ this year will have been born in 1985 or after, and all but one of the module’s primary texts were written before their lifetime. Far from being ‘contemporary’, these texts were published in another world, before the students were born: The French Lieutenant’s Woman, Nights at the Circus, If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (and Blade Runner), White Noise: this is Mum and Dad’s culture. Some of the texts (‘The Library of Babel’) were written even before their parents were born. Replace this cache with other postmodern stalwarts – Beloved, Flaubert’s Parrot, Waterland, The Crying of Lot 49, Pale Fire, Slaughterhouse 5, Lanark, Neuromancer, anything by B.S. Johnson – and the same applies. It’s all about as contemporary as The Smiths, as hip as shoulder pads, as happening as Betamax video recorders. These are texts which are just coming to grips with the existence of rock music and television; they mostly do not dream even of the possibility of the technology and communications media – mobile phones, email, the internet, computers in every house powerful enough to put a man on the moon – which today’s undergraduates take for granted.

    The reason why the primary reading on British postmodernism fictions modules is so old, in relative terms, is that it has not been rejuvenated. Just look out into the cultural market-place: buy novels published in the last five years, watch a twenty-first century film, listen to the latest music – above all just sit and watch television for a week – and you will hardly catch a glimpse of postmodernism. Similarly, one can go to literary conferences (as I did in July) and sit through a dozen papers which make no mention of Theory, of Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard. The sense of superannuation, of the impotence and the irrelevance of so much Theory among academics, also bears testimony to the passing of postmodernism. The people who produce the cultural material which academics and non-academics read, watch and listen to, have simply given up on postmodernism. The occasional metafictional or self-conscious text will appear, to widespread indifference – like Bret Easton Ellis’ Lunar Park – but then modernist novels, now long forgotten, were still being written into the 1950s and 60s. The only place where the postmodern is extant is in children’s cartoons like Shrek and The Incredibles, as a sop to parents obliged to sit through them with their toddlers. This is the level to which postmodernism has sunk; a source of marginal gags in pop culture aimed at the under-eights.
    Kirby suggests that Postmodernism has been replaced by Pseudo-Modernism, which he says is characterized by interactive web surfing and activities such as video gaming. I think this is a rather superficial, pup-cultural analysis. I much prefer Timotheus Vermeulen's theory of "Metamodernism", which he says is characterized by "discourse, oscillating between a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony". In other words, Postmodernism's frontal attack on metanarrative has failed. The search for universal truth is back in style -- albeit there are many competing Truths, and every candidate Truth is subject to roasting at Comedy Central.
     
  14. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    Perhaps you and I should confess to being philosophical dilettantes with respect to exactly what Postmodernism, and other such '-isms' is and isn't. If a particular socio-economic construct as Capitalism or Marxism is a 'metanarrative', I have assumed, from my observations of others' discussions, that such as our attempt to define a contiguous, multi-generational project, as explicitly mentioned in the OT (120 references) and the NT (80 references), as a 'grand-metanarrative' is a summary judgement, non-starter for consideration in consensus reality society. Because it's impossible, per PM, the most inane of 'conspiracy theory' - despite that its composed of so many otherwise bolstering dots, or inconvenient factoids and encompassing a coherent 'fabric' of contextual threads. Such as 'plausible deniability' disallows the connection of said dots, and such dots can easier go into the memory hole.

    Maybe, we need a better lexicon to describe the phenomenon? Like your "pup culture"? :)

    As I understand it, Postmodernism (aside from its various public facing, cultural manifestations) was sold to such as 'liberal' academia' as a set of intellectual tools (e.g. deconstruction, etc.) meant to defang such top-down, 'Traditional', meta-narrative constructs as reactionary 'fascism', etc.. Unfortunately these tools have a specialist lexicon that is bewildering in the extreme, and in totality the field seemed rife for the typical (negative) elite co-optation we see constantly, such as with the Populist (false advertising) phenomenon, or with the Nazi's false advertising of their 'socialism'.

    My most specific understanding was derived from reading an analysis of a Postmodernist book's rendering of Western History, where its slant was derived from the premise that there is no human project that can span more than three generations without inherently collapsing. Here again, we can ignore the religious institutions (because they are 'divine'). Thus, lineal dynasties collapse and such (which is why Republican and Imperial Rome, and beyond, should be viewed as a 'tribal' corporation instead).

    The mechanism for such control of 'history' writ large or small, and regardless of our understanding of 'Postmodernism', is that the same 'people' that can otherwise easily be seen effecting [sic] impactful historical events also have outsized influence upon the media, government, and even religion. And these same people seem to have zero concern for "specific local contexts", other than the various human sheep living within such flocky "local contexts" are theirs to shear via their flunkies.

    See more here: https://postflaviana.org/community/...hird-and-fourth-reichs.2422/page-4#post-11009
     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2018 at 10:42 PM
  15. Richard Stanley

    Richard Stanley Administrator

    OK, returning from our digression into Postmodernism, let's get back to one of Suvorov's Icebreaker claims, i.e. that Stalin was desiring that Hitler finish taking the balance of Europe, especially England (before the Americans could use it as a launchpad to invade mainland Europe). Having Hitler do this would both destroy European military resistance and severely hurt the Nazi military ability to respond to Stalin's surprise attack at Hitler's turned back. This would make it much easier for Stalin and the Comintern to achieve their overt goals of furthering the advance of global Communism.

    After the division of Poland, it first appeared that Stalin was going to get his wish as Hitler left his new Eastern frontier lightly defended. As 'shit happens' we are told, the Nazis did a pirouette around the Maginot Line and then the British forces already deployed in France were able to make an amazing escape back across the English channel from Dunkirk, saved to fight another day. And, then we are told (not by Suvorov) that Hitler could not bring himself to invade England, because he felt an Aryan affinity with the British people, which was also the supposed motivation for Rudolf Hess's rogue flight to England, a spurious peace mission. As Suvorov went at length to discuss, the Nazis and the Soviets carved up all the countries in between themselves, and in the process the Soviets had made an initial foray towards the Romanian oil fields that were the life blood to the Nazi war machine. This foray was certainly noticed by the Nazis, and forced Hitler to redeploy to the Eastern frontier, knowing he would have to protect the Ploești oil fields and then take the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus region. The invasion was sold as the need to protect suffering Germanic peoples living inside the Soviet Union, and in obtaining German lebensraum more generally.

    Let's contextually remind ourselves that the present Hanover-Saxe-Coburg (aka Windsor) royal family of England is of 'German' origins since George I, and that George II's actions with regards to Göttingen University's synthesis of the Romantic Movement gave us the Nazi and Völkisch cultural affinity for Blood and Soil. As Tupper Saussy laid out in Ruler's of Evil, it was George III's (the titular head of the fake Protestant Church of England) machinations with Catholic Lords Bute and Baltimore, and the American Freemasons (such as John Adams and his Tea Party) that separated formerly happy American colonists from England. Is anybody getting a sense of déjà vuyet (I just coined this term :rolleyes:)?

    OK, now we got the context on-the-ground needed to proceed with discussing Suvorov's data (in the next posts).
     

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